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TO BE YOUNG, POOR, SEXUALLY ACTIVE, 

AND IN NEED OF BIRTH CONTROL: 

INDIGENT MINORS' ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVES 

I. INTRODUCTION 
In many states, minors! may be unable to optain prescription 
contraceptives unless they either obtain the conse~t. of their par­
ents or notifY2 them that they are seeking contraceptive services. 
This mandatory parental involvement, r~oted in tli~ common law 
rule that minors lack the capacity to consent to their own medical 
treatment, has been reinforced by Supreme Court decisions. These 
cases hold that parents have a fundamental right to control the up­
bringing of their children. A real possibility exists that courts in 
many jurisdictions, recognizing this parental right,· will continue to 
allow parents to control, or at least become involved in, their chil­
dren's decisions to obtain prescription contraceptives. 
Mandatory parental involvement in the form of consent or 
notification requirements seriously impairs the minor's access to 
prescription contraceptives; while consent requirements give par­
ents a veto over the minor's decision to obtain contraceptives. 
Notification requirements often discourage minors from even at­
tempting to obtain contraceptive services. 3 Although such parental 
1. Throughout this article, the term "minor" will refer to any person who is 
below the age of legal majority. 
2. Parental notification requirements ensure that parents will be informed of 
the decision of the minor to obtain medical treatment, but do not give them the 
power to directly prevent the desired treatment. See State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 
901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975); Comment, The Validity of Parental Consent Statutes after 
Planned Parenthood, 54 J. URB. L. 127 (1976); Note, Abortion-Possible Alternatives 
to Unconstitutional Spousal and Parental Consent Provisions of Missouri's Abortion 
Law, 42 Mo. L. REV. 291, 295-96 (1977). 
3. Mandatory parental involvement in the decision-making of sexually active 
minors, even in the form of parental notification requirements, has a chilling effect 
on the minor's desire to seek needed contraception. Although studies have estab­
lished that many teenagers (55%) who use family planning clinics involve their par­
ents in the decision to seek contraception, many teenagers who visit clinics 
on their own have indicated that they would not use such services if their parents 
were notified. One study reveals that 20% would discontinue clinic attendance al­
together and would use less effective non-medical methods of contraception, 12% 
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involvement impairs the ability of all young people to obtain con­
traceptives, the burden falls disproportionately on indigent minors 
who experience greater difficulties both gaining access to con­
traceptives and dealing with an unwanted pregnancy. Initially, in­
digent minors are at a disadvantage because they must depend on 
publicly funded family planning programs rather than private 
physicians. 4 These programs, which involve state action, may be 
constitutionally required to involve parents in their minor child's 
decision to seek contraceptives. 5 Since private physicians are not 
agents of the state, they cannot be similarly restricted. Con­
sequently, those who cannot afford a private physician may face a 
greater risk of an unwanted pregnancy. 
Once an unwanted pregnancy occurs, the indigent young 
woman is less likely to be able to obtain an abortion than her more 
affiuent peer. Recent Supreme Court decisions have held that 
would continue having sex using no method, and only 4% would stop having sexual 
intercourse altogether. Torres, Does Your Mother Know . .. ?, 10 FAM. PLAN. PER­
SPECTIVES 280, 281 (1978). These figures indicate that any kind of mandatory pa­
rental involvement in the minor's decision discourages the use of the most effective 
methods of contraception and could lead to a significant difference in the numbers 
of illegitimate children and teenage abortions. Id. at 282. 
The chilling effect of mandatory parental involvement on the minor's decision to 
obtain contraception may be greater for indigents than for those from higher income 
families. It has been suggested that the "lower class family is, if anything, even more 
puritanical and prudish about sexual matters than families with higher incomes." 
Furstenberg, The Social Consequences 'of Teenage Parenthood, 8 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSPECTIVES 148, 151 (1976). This implies that the indigent minor might be even 
less willing to obtain contraceptives if she knows her parents will find out. 
4. See Comment, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of 
Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1009 (1975) [here­
inafter cited as Parental Consent Requirements]; Comment, A Minor's Right to Con­
traceptives, 7 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 270 (1974) [hereinafter cited as A Minor's 
Right]. See generally note 65 infra. 
The unavailability of clinics that provide contraceptive services puts the indigent 
minor at an additional disadvantage. The majority of large cities in the United States 
have some special programs for the pregnant teenager. More than 40% of these pro­
grams, however, do not proVide contraceptive services for teenagers. U.S. Cities 
Shortchange Most Pregnant Teens, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 167 (1978). "[A]l­
though contraception ... should be given high priority for sexually active teenagers, 
10 other services (counseling, special education, family life education, nutrition, spe­
cial health classes, sex education, social service, home visiting, inter-disciplinary 
staff, and vocational assistance) were provided more frequently than contraception 
.... " Goldstein & Wallace, Services For & Needs of Pregnant Teenagers in Large 
Cities of the United States, 1976,93 PUB. HEALTH REp. 46, 49 (1978). In addition, in 
1975, 592 countries provided no contraceptive services to meet the needs of some 
160,000 15- to 19-year-olds. Dryfoos & Heisler, Contraceptive Services for Adoles­
cents: An Overview, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 223, 229 (1978). 
5. See notes 117-22 infra and accompanying text. 
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states are not required under federal law to fund abortions under 
their medicaid programs. 6 Therefore, unless the state offers free 
abortion services, the indigent woman must either procure a 
dangerous illegal abortion or bear the child. If she chooses the lat­
ter, the indigent young mother is likely to experience the great 
social and economic difficulties of adolescent childbearing. 7 Be­
cause of the limited alternatives available to indigent minors to 
prevent pregnancy, coupled with the special severity of problems 
that they must face when they become pregnant, their need for 
access to contraceptives is in many ways more urgent than that of 
their wealthier counterparts. 
This article examines the sources, extent, and" constitutionality 
of mandatory parental involvement in the minor's decision to seek 
prescription contraceptives. It focuses on the importance to indi­
gent minors of access to contraceptives through publicly funded 
family planning programs. The article attempts to outline the means 
by which adequate access to contraceptives can be promoted. 'In so 
doing the competing interests of parents and minors will be 
analyzed to determine the extent to which parental involvement 
should be permitted in order to best promote the minor's welfare 
while at the same time limiting infringement on parental rights. 




Under common law principles, physicians had to obtain paren­
tal consent before providing medical treatment to minors. This re­
quirement was based on the assumption that minors did not pos­
sess the knowledge, intelligence, or maturity to comprehend the 
risks of medical treatment. 8 Absent parental consent, the attending 
physician risked tort liability for battery.9 The threat of such liabil­
6. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 526 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Heal 
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). These cases held that the states have no obligation to 
make medicaid funds or public hospital facilities available to indigent women seek­
ing non-therapeutic abortions. See Note, Indigent Women-What Right to Abortion? 
28 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 709 (1978). It has been determined that poor, rural, young, 
and black women are disproportionately represented among those women who de­
sire abortion services but cannot gain access to them. Forrest, Tietze, & Sullivan, 
Abortion in the United States, 1976-1977, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 271 (1978). 
7. See notes 31-40 infra and accompanying text. 
8. Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Con­
sent, 60 VA. L. REV. 305, 309 (1974) (footnote omitted). See Pilpel, Minors' Rights to 
Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. REV. 462, 464 (1972). 
9. See Note, supra note 8, at 309; Parental Consent Requirements, supra note 
4, at 1001; Comment, Sexual Privacy: Access of a Minor to Contraceptives, Abortion, 
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ity understandably made physicians reluctant to treat a minor with­
out first obtaining parental consent. 
Many courts and legislatures, recognizing that it is often bene­
ficial to permit minors to consent for their own medical treatment, 
have developed exceptions to the common law doctrine. For exam­
ple, physicians need not obtain parental consent in an emergency 
situation in which the life or health of a child is seriously threat­
ened. 10 The "emancipated minor," by virtue of marriage or indepen­
dence from her parents, is also often deemed capable of consent­
ing for her own treatment. ll Finally, "mature minors," teenagers 
with adequately developed moral and intellectual maturity, have 
been granted the power of consent,12 as increasingly "the courts 
have focused on the fact of maturity, rather than the fiction of in­
fancy."13 Despite these exceptions, the common law doctrine of 
parental consent, as it applies to prescription contraceptive ser­
vices, is still the law in many jurisdictions. 14 It therefore remains a 
and Sterilization Without Parental Consent, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 221, 222 (1977). See 
also Stem, Medical J:reatment and the Teenager: The Need for Parental Consent, 7 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 4 (1973); Wallington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of 
Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. U5 (1973). 
10. This emergency situation rule was true even under the common law. 
FAMILY PLANNING, CONTRACEPTION, AND VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION: AN AN­
ALYSIS OF LAWS AND POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, EACH STATE AND JURIS­
DICTION 70, 71 (Department of Health, Education & Welfare Pub. No. (HSA) 74­
16001, 1974) [hereinafter cited as FAMILY PLANNING). See Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 
Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931); Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d 196 (La. Ct. App. 
1949); Sullivan v. Montgomery, 155 Misc. 448, 279 N.Y.S. 575 (1935); Browning v. 
Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, III S.E. 492 (1922). 
11. The emancipated minor may give effective consent for her own treatment 
by virtue of a marriage, the failure of parents to meet their legal responsibilities, the 
fact that the minor is living apart from her natural parents, or the fact that the minor 
is otherwise self-supporting. Parental Consent Requirements, supra note 4, at 1002. See 
Pilpel, supra note 8, at 465. See Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hosp., 49 Misc. 2d 207, 
267 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966); Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16, 
431 P.2d 719 (1967). 
12. The mature minor doctrine "provides that a minor effectively can consent 
to medical treatment for himself if he understands the nature of the treatment and it 
is for his benefit." FAMILY PLANNING, supra note 10, at 72 (footnote omitted). This 
exception recognizes that minors should be able to give consent for their own medi­
cal treatment regardless of age, contingent only on their capacity to make an in­
formed, reasoned decision. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); 
Younts v. St. Francis Hosp., 205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d 330 (1970); Bishop v. Shurly, 237 
Mich. 76,211 N.W. 75 (1926); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956); 
Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16,431 P.2d 719 (1967). 
13. Zuckerman, Abortion and Contraception: A Minor's Constitutional Right 
to Privacy, 4 FAM. PLAN. POPULATION REP. U4, 120 (1975). 
14. Parental consent requirements have been repealed in a number of jurisdic­
tions. See note 48 infra and accompanying text. Jurisdiction~ which have not re­
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theoretical obstacle to a minor's access, even though today, as a 
practical matter, physicians do not face a real risk of liability. IS 
The modern rationale for requiring mandatory parental in­
volvement focuses on the positive rights of the parents to rear their 
child rather than the common law notion of the incapacity of 
minors. The Supreme Court's recognition of and emphasis on the 
fundamental rights of parents, along with its failure to expand the 
magnitude of the minor's right to obtain contraception, has aided in 
perpetuating the requirements of parental involvement. 16 Even 
where the competing constitutional rights of parents have not sup­
ported the constitutionality of parental consent requirements, pa­
rental involvement in the form of parental notification require­
ments is still constitutionally permissible. 17 
III. THE NEED FOR CONTRACEPTIVES AND 
THE EXTENT OF ACCESS 
A. The Need 
A growing segment of the teenage population engages in sex­
ual intercourse. I8 A 1971 study estimated that "nearly 2.4 million, 
pealed the common law impliedly 'retain the requirement of parental consent. See, 
e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12f (West Supp. 1979). 
15. "There appear to be no reported cases holding a physician civilly liable for 
damages" for providing minors over 15 with medical care absent parental consent, 
where the treatment granted was for the benefit of the minor and with the minor's 
consent. Zuckerman, supra note 13, at 115. Further, no state currently has statutes 
which impose criminal sanctions for the distribution of contraceptives to minors 
without the consent of their parents. Internal Memorandum, Planned Parenthood 
Federation of America, Inc., April 20, 1978, at 12 [hereinafter cited as Memoran­
dum]. See FAMILY PLANNING, supra note 10. 
16. The strength of the parents' constitutional right to rear their children may 
force the continued acceptance of mandatory parental involvement. See notes 117­
22 infra and accompanying text. 
17. No statutes explicitly permit minors to receive prescription contraceptives 
absent parental notification. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that even 
where parental consent may not be constitutionally permissible, parental notification 
may pass constitutional scrutiny. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'), 431 U.S. 678 
(1977). 
18. "[I]t is clear from the rising rates of teenage illegitimacy and venereal dis­
ease and the large number of abortions among teenagers that a considerable number 
of young people are sexually active." House & Goldsmith, Planned Parenthood Serv­
ices for the Young Teenager, 4 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 27 (1972). Studies show 
that these young teenagers "are not deterred by the fear of pregnancy or the absence 
of contraception." Settlage, Baroff, & Cooper, Sexual Experience of Younger Teenage 
Girls Seeking Contraceptive Assistance for the First Time,S FAM. PLAN. PERSPEC­
TIVES 223 (1973). 
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(or 28%) never-married young women in the United States aged 
15-19 ... have had some coital experience."19 A 1976 follow-up 
study indicated that the age at which sexual intercourse is first ex­
perienced is decreasing while the extent of teenage intercourse is 
increasing. 2o This study shows that the number of sexually active 
never-married women increased by thirty percent from 1971­
1976.21 The study concluded that fifty-five percent of all never­
married women in the United States in 1976 had engaged in sexual 
intercourse by the time they were nineteen. 22 
This extensive teenage sexual activity leads to approximately 
780,000 premarital teenage pregnancies per year, most of them 
unwanted. 23 An unwanted pregnancy is a difficult situation for a 
woman at any age. The problems associated with an unintended 
pregnancy are intensified, however, when the expectant woman is 
a teenager. 24 Greater medical risks are involved in a teenage preg­
nancy, including "increased frequency of anemia, hypertension, 
eclampsia and maternal mortality as well as the risk of stillbirth, 
prematurity, perinatal and infant mortality and brain injury to the 
child born. "25 These risks are especially prevalent for those 
younger than fifteen. 26 
19. Kantner & Zelnik, Sexual Experience of Young Unmarried Women in the 
United States, 4 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 9 (1972). 
20. Zelnik & Kantner, Sexual and Contraceptive EX)1erience of Young Unmar­
ried Women in the United States, 1976 and 1971, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 55 
(1977). 
21. Id. This study notes that the increase has occurred at all ages and among all 
races. However, the incidence of intercourse among blacks at age 19 (83.6%) is much 
greater than that of whites (48.7%).Id. at 56. 
22. Id. 
23. See Zelnik & Kantner, Contraceptive Patterns and Premarital Pregnancy 
Among Women Aged 15-19 in 1976, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 135, 142 (1978). 
24. Teenage mothers are much more likely to drop out of school, be poor, and 
depend on welfare. Goldstein & Wallace, supra note 4, at 47. See Furstenberg, supra 
note 3; Menken, The Health and Social Consequences of Teenage Childbearing, 4 
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 45 (1972). See generally Paul, Pilpel, & Wechsler, Preg­
nancy, Teenagers and the Law, 1974, 6 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 142 (1974); Ado­
lescent Fertility-Risks and Consequences, POPULATION REp. Series J, No. 10, at 
J-157 (July 1976) [hereinafter cited as Adolescent Fertility]. 
25. FAMILY PLANNING, supra note lO, at 71. See Johnson, Adolescent Preg­
nancy: Intervention Into the Poverty Cycle, 9 ADOLESCENCE 394, 395-97 (1974); 
Menken, supra note 15, at 46-51; ALLAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, 11 MILLION 
TENNAGERS: WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THE EPIDEMIC OF ADOLESCENT PREG­
NANCIES IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (1976); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 
U.S. 678, 696 n.21 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
26. There were approximately 30,000 pregnancies experienced by women 14 
and younger in 1974. This reflects a general increase in fertility among this group. 
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If the minor resorts to abortion in an attempt to terminate the 
pregnancy, she faces additional medical risks inherent in the pro­
cedure. 27 Many teenagers are exposed to this potential danger, as 
nearly three out of ten teenage pregnancies end in induced abor­
tion. 28 The risks associated with abortion may run even higher to 
the poor who cannot afford to obtain a legal abortion29 and must 
resort to more hazardous alternatives. 
In addition to the medical risks involved in an unwanted teen­
age pregnancy, serious social and pyschological consequences and 
economic hardships often accompany the pregnancy and subse­
quent birth of the child. Studies have recognized that "bearing a 
first child while in her teens is likely to be a critical turning point 
in a young woman's life."30 The result has been that teenage 
mothers have "consistently experienced greater difficulty in realiz­
31ing life plans" than their peers.
One immediate consequence of an unwanted pregnancy is fre­
quently the disruption of the minor's education both before and 
Pregnancy among such young people is clearly associated with an extremely 
high risk of health, social and economic problems, because the youngsters 
are unprepared, biologically and psychologically, for the responsibilities of 
parenthood and have had only limited education. Whatever index is used­
from dropping out of school to dying on the delivery table or losing one's 
baby-the adolescent under 15 is at the greatest risk of adverse conse­
quences. 
Jaffe & Dryfoos, Fertility Control Services for Adolescents: Access and Utilization, 8 
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 167, 174 (1976). 
27. The health risks involved with an abortion become greater as the term of 
the pregnancy increases. Roe v. Wade, 4lO u.s. 113, 150 (1973). 
28. Jaffe & Dryfoos, supra note 26, at 172. The ratio of abortions to live births 
has been steadily increasing. Among 15- to 19-year-olds, there were 181 abortions 
per 1,000 live births in 1971 as opposed to 389 per 1,000 live births in 1974. 
29. See note 16 supra. 
30. Menken, 'supra note 24, at 45 (footnote omitted). Parents who bear children 
while in their teens "are more likely to be disadvantaged in the socioeconomic sense 
... than those ... who postpone childbearing at least until the mother is in her early 
twenties." Id. at 52. See Furstenberg, supra note 3, at 160, 161; Johnson, supra note 
25, at 398-99. 
High birthrates among young mothers also perpetuate a low economic status by 
the addition of dependents. "[T]he number of children a woman has borne is in­
versely related to her education and to other socioeconomic variables." Menken, 
supra note 24, at 52. See Card & Wise, Teenage Mothers and Teenage Fathers: The 
Impact of Early Childbearing on the Parents' Personal and Professional Lives, lO 
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 199,202-03 (1978); Trussell & Menken, Early Childbear­
ing and Subsequent Fertility, lO FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 209 (1978). 
31. Furstenberg, supra note 3, at 162. In contrast to their classmates who be­
came premaritally pregnant, those who did not had a better record of attaining their 
immediate objectives in life. Id. 
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after the birth of the child. 32 A young mother will often be pre­
vented from completing her high school education and subse­
quently hindered in pursuing further education. 33 This is espe­
cially true for indigent minors who cannot rely on their families to 
support and care for the child while they finish their s~hooling. 
Lack of education will usually prevent the young mother from ob­
taining satisfactory employment, thereby perpetuating her financial 
hardships.34 In addition, the disruption of a young mother's educa­
tion is likely to sever important peer group relationships which 
"undoubtedly inhibits normal growth and development,"35 damag­
ing the young mother psychologically as well as socially and eco­
nomically. 
Marital stability often eludes couples whose marriage results 
from an unintended pregnancy.36 In an attempt to secure adequate 
care for herself and her child, the young mother may be compelled 
to marry someone she might not otherwise have chosen.37 Mar­
riage to a father who is uneducated and possesses limited market­
able skills perpetuates poverty in the family contributing to marital 
discord. For the indigent young woman already suffering economic 
hardship, the added pressures of such a pregnancy increase the 
chances that the marriage will quickly dissolve. 38 
32. "Early childrearing undoubtedly decreases the amount of time, money, and 
physical and psychic energy the teenager, especially from a low-income background, 
might normally be able to invest in educational pursuits." Johnson, supra note 2S, at 
398. 
33. Card & Wise, supra note 30, at 200-01. Many women are required to leave 
school because of their pregnancy and a majority of these women have trouble re­
turning because of the necessity to care for the child. Menken, supra note 24, at S1. 
See Furstenberg, supra note 3, at IS9-60. Young fathers are also likely to give up 
their education to join the labor force to support the new family. Card & Wise, supra 
note 30, at 201. 
34. See Card & Wise, supra note 30, at 201-02. 

3S. Johnson, supra note 2S, at 398. 

36. Studies have shown that the divorce rate for teenage marriages is generally 
very high. Card & Wise, supra note 30, at 202; Menken, supra note 24, at S1. One 
such study showed that three out of five such marriages are destined to dissolve after 
six years. Furstenberg, supra note 3, at IS6. 
37. Of course the fathers of unintended children face many of the same prob­
lems that burden the young mother. Furstenberg, supra note 3, at IS6. Most fathers 
entering into sudden marriages have low income-earning potential even before they 
wed, and will probably face limited prospects for economic advancement if they are 
also forced to terminate their education in order to find a job. Card & Wise, supra 
note 30, at 201. 
38. See Card & Wise, supra note 30, at 202. See also Adolescent Fertility, supra 
note 24, at J-163-64. 
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An indigent young mother, without a family that can help ab­
sorb the costs of childbearing, must often resort to state welfare 
programs in order to survive. 39 When this occurs, taxpayers must 
absorb the costs of an unintended pregnancy and an unwanted 
child. Since the costs of preventing conception are less than the 
subsequent support costs for children born to indigent mothers, it 
is in the state's economic interest to promote the use of contracep­
tives by sexually active minors.40 To adequately protect both young 
people and society from the effects of unintended pregnancies, 
programs must be maintained which can best achieve the goal of 
limiting unwanted teenage pregnancies. 
B. 	 The Inadequate Response 
A response to the problem of unintended births can take three 
different approaches. These are: (1) preventing intercourse, (2) pre­
venting conception, and (3) terminating the pregnancy.41 Prevent­
ing intercourse among teenagers is not a feasible alternative. Such 
a measure would require a massive change in values on the part 
of our nation's youth or the twenty-four ho~r per day supervision 
of their activities. Terminating the pregnancy, although feasible 
where resources and moral values allow, is not the most desirable 
method of preventing teenage parenthood due to the inherent 
physical and psychological risks of abortion. 42 The remaining 
choice, preventing conception, is the simplest, cheapest, safest, 
and most effective alternative. 43 It has been estimated that at least 
39. The young mother is much more likely to be a welfare dependent than her 
peers. Furstenberg, supra note 3, at 160. 
40. 	 See note 52 infra. 
41. 	 Johnson, supr(jo note 25, at 400. 
42. The availability of relatively safe and effective methods of contraception 
makes the use of even a legal abortion as an alternative means of birth control seem 
unreasonable and certainly ill-advised. "From a medical, sociological and legal point 
of view, it makes no sense that abortion become a more viable solution to unwanted 
pregnancy than contraception." A Minor's Right, supra note 4, at 275. 
43. Recognition of the need to prevent conception rather than to resort to abor­
tion is reflected in a recent report to Governor Carey, prepared by the New York 
Department of Social Services. This report emphasizes the need to make more funds 
available for the prevention of unwanted teenage conception and childbearing. This 
contrasts with the present policy of the state, which is to spend the majority of its 
state and federal funds for welfare assistance to already pregnant adolescents and 
young mothers. N.Y. State Report: Prevention Key to Reducing Teenage Pregnancy; 
Governor Asks $1 Million, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 293 (1978). 
One study has criticized the Carter administration's response to help prevent 
unwanted pregnancy claiming it emphasizes and funds alternatives to abortion rather 
than alternatives to pregnancies. This approach is not viewed as being an effective 
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313,000 teenage pregnancies could be prevented each year through 
regular use of contraceptives. 44 This figure demonstrates that un­
restricted access to contraceptives is a practical means to reduce 
by as much as forty percent the number of premarital teenage 
pregnancies. 
In view of these statistics, states increasingly have recognized 
the importance of granting minors the right to consent for prescrip­
tion contraceptives in particular,45 as well as medical treatment 
generally.46 By October 1976, thirty states and the District of Co­
lumbia had explicitly provided persons under eighteen the right to 
response to needed prevention of pregnancies among adolescents. Dryfoos & 
Heisler, supra note 4, at 223. 
44. Zelnick & Kantner, supra note 23, at 142. Statistics for 1976 show that 
780,000 of the more than 1,000,000 pregnancies of 15- to 19-year-olds occurred pre­
maritally. It is estimated that an additional 680,000 (or 1,460,000 total) premarital 
pregnancies would have resulted had not any of these sexually active teenagers used 
contraceptives. It is further estimated that 
if all the teenagers who did not intend to give birth had been consistent 
users of contraception there would have been about 467,000 premarital preg­
nancies (half of them intended)-313,000 or 40 percent, fewer than the 
780,000 premarital pregnancies that actually occurred. In other words, the 
difference between no use of contraception and always-use (by those who do 
not want to conceive) is about one million pregnancies. 
[d. These calculations suggest the approximate number of unintended pregnancies 
that could be avoided if the regular and effective use of contraceptives among sexu­
ally active teenagers could be increased. [d·. The new report by the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare's National Center for Health Statistics showed that 
the rate of teenage out-of-wedlock childbearing fell for the first time since 1962, 
probably due in large part to thl! increased availability of contraceptives. Available 
Contraception Lowers Teen Birthrates, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 160 (1978). 
The efficacy of contraceptives is further demonstrated by statistics showing that a 
sexually active woman who never uses a method of contraception runs a 58% chance 
of an unwanted pregnancy. Alternatively, a sexually active woman who regularly 
uses a contraceptive runs only an 11% risk of an unwanted pregnancy, and only a 6% 
risk if she uses a medical contraceptive. Zelnik & Kantner, supra note 23, at 141. 
45. [d. at 27. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10053.2 (West 1972); N.Y. 
Soc. SERVo LAw § 350(1)(e) (McKinney 1976); VA. CODE § 32-137 (1973). 
46. Increasingly, the federal government and the states are recognizing the 
right of minors to make their own decisions involving access to medical care. FAM­
ILY PLANNING, supra note 10, at 70. See generally Paul, Pilpel, & Wechsler, supra 
note 24. 
In response to the need for making treatment easily available to minors when 
they are faced with high medical risks, every state now has special provisions which 
enable minors to obtain medical treatment for venereal disease without parental con­
sent. A. SUSSMAN, THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE 31 (1977). See FAMILY PLANNING, 
supra note 10, at 75. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343 (West Supp. 1978); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:17A-4 (1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10104 (Purdon 1977). Most 
states similarly provide treatment for drug addiction or alcoholism. A. SUSSMAN, 
supra, at 31. 
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obtain contraceptives without parental consent. 47 Although these 
provisions prevent parental veto over the minor's decision to use 
contraceptives, parental notification requirements and the accom­
panying impairment of access may still be permitted. 48 
Congress has also recognized the importance of the availability 
of contraceptive services to minors through provisions of the Social 
Security Act. 49 The 1972 amendments to the medicaid provisions of 
Title XIX now provide that family planning services must be fur­
nished "to individuals of child-bearing age (including minors who 
can be considered to be sexually active) who are eligible under the 
State plan and who desire such services and supplies."50 Similarly, 
the 1972 amendments to the social services provisions of Title IV A 
of the Act require that states promptly furnish family planning ser­
vices to all individuals (specifically including sexually active minors) 
requesting those services. 51 The enactment of these provisions re­
veal Congressional concern with preventing an increase of those 
dependent on federal funds. 52 
The intent behind Titles XIX and IV A was implicitly recog­
nized by the Supreme Court when it decided Jones v. T.R.53 
There, the Court affirmed the district court holding that access to 
contraceptives as provided for by these provisions could not be re­
stricted by a Utah statute requiring written parental consent. 54 
47. Memorandum, supra note 15, at 2. This position is reflected in the official 
policy of Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., which is to furnish minors 
with contraceptives without the requirement of parental consent or notification. 
ld. at 1. 
48. See note 17 supra. 
49. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-1396 (1974). 
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(vii)(4)(c) (1974). See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a­
(a)(8) (1974) (requiring states to provide medical treatment to those eligible). 
51. 42 U.S.C.A. 3602(a)(15)(A) (1974). 
52. The policy of providing the indigent with access to contraceptives reflects 
the tremendous costs to society that result from birth to mothers receiving AFDC 
benefits. In 1975, $9.4 billion was distributed through the AFDC program, of which 
$4.65 billion went to households including women who had their first child as 
teenagers. These amounts do not include administrative costs, expenditures for 
medicaid programs, food stamps, etc. Moore, Teenage Childbirth and Welfare De­
pendency, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 233, 234 (1978). In contrast, the cost of 
providing effective contraceptive services is only about $66 per client per year. 
Therefore it is estimated that it would cost the government only ~1l2 million per 
year to provide modem birth control services to all of the 1.6 million sexually active 
teenagers at risk of an unwanted pregnancy but not currently receiving services. 
ld. at 235. 
53. Jones v. T.H., 425 U.S. 986 (1976). 
54. ld. at 878. The Supreme Court here affirmed the decision of the Utah dis­
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Apart from the invalidation of the Utah statute, however, the Jones 
decision has limited impact in providing minors with unrestricted 
access to contraceptives. 55 First, the court left open the question of 
whether a restriction less onerous than the Utah statute's consent 
requirement might be permissible under the Act. 56 Second, the 
impact of this decision is limited to those indigent minors who are 
eligible for medicaid or AFDC benefits. 57 Low income minors not 
involved in these programs may still be faced with parental consent 
requirements restricting their access to contraceptives. Third, and 
most significant, the Supreme Court's order did not embrace the 
district court's holding which found the minor's right to contracep­
tion to be fundamental. 58 The court's failure to consider this issue, 
leaves the constitutional status of the minor's right to obtain pre­
scription contraceptives subject to interpretation by the lower 
courtS. 59 Moreover, it leaves the way clear for Congress to alter 
the underlying legislative policy of these provisions by permitting 
mandatory parental involvement. 60 
trict court which had invalidated Utah regulations requiring the prior written consent 
of the parents. T__ H__ v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Utah 1975). The district 
court found these regulations to be inconsistent with the language of the Social Se­
curity Act, which explicitly calls for the participating states to furnish such services 
to sexually acti'(e minors who voluntarily request them. 
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments bears out Congress' concern 
that AFDC and Medicaid family planning services be provided to sexually 
active minors who desire them on a confidential basis; in this way Congress 
has sought to stem the rising number of births out of wedlock and the con­
sequent increase in the numbers of welfare recipients. 
Id. at 878 (footnote omitted). 
55. T_ H_ v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Utah 1975). 
56. Under 45 C.F.R. § 220.21 (1976), parental consent may be permitted to re­
strict access to contraceptives under the federal provisions where existing state law 
stipulates a specific age of consent for other medically related services. Since Utah 
did not have a law specifically requiring similar provisions, they could not enact a 
limitation addressed solely to contraception. T__ H__ v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873, 
879 n.4 (C.D. Utah 1975). 
57. All state plans for medical assistance must make such assistance avail­
able to those eligible under IV A. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(1O)(A) (1974). See also 45 
C.F.R. § 249.IO(a)(9). 
58. The district court determined that the minor's right to contraceptives was 
fundamental and could only be limited by a compelling state interest. See note 108 
infra and accompanying text. 
59. The Court also did not expressly confront the competing constitutional 
claims of parents and the impact that they might have on the validity of the federal 
legislation. See notes 109-22 infra and accompanying text. An analysis of the Su­
preme Court's subsequent opinions suggests that the Court is not ready to free the 
minor's decision to obtain contraceptives from parental notice requirements. See 
notes 79-102 infra and accompanying text. 
60. For example, an amendment to Title X of the Public Health Service Act has 
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The failure of the courts and legislatures to eliminate parental 
involvement from the minor's decision to obtain contraceptives 
could impair the ability of family planning programs to reduce un­
wanted pregnancies among teenagers. There has been a tremen­
dous growth of family planning programs in the United States in 
recent years. 61 The establishment of these programs on both the 
state and federal level has been extremely important in enabling 
minors to obtain contraceptive services. 62 The poor have been the 
primary beneficiaries of these programs. 63 Nine out of ten, or 3.6 
been proposed to the Senate. This would alter Title X of the Public Health Act to re­
quire all United States family planning clinics funded under the Act to notify parents 
before furnishing contraceptives to their children. 
61. Torres, supra note 3, at 280. Organized family planning programs have in­
creased approximately four times since their inception in 1968 and have served an 
estimated 4.1 million women in 1976. Torres, Organized Family Planning Services 
in the United States, 1968-1976, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 83 (1978). 
62. Final natality statistics for 1976, as reported by the Department of Health, 
Education & Welfare's National Center for Health Statistics, showed a decline in 
adolescent fertility and illegitimacy for the first time since 1962. The sharpest de­
cline occurred among black teenagers. Available Contraception Lowers Teen Birth­
rates, supra note 44, at 160. Studies have concluded that "organized (mostly publicly 
supported) family planning clinics were highly effective in preventing unwanted and 
mistimed pregnancies." Okada & Gillespie, The Impact of Family Planning Pro­
grams on Unplanned Pregnancies, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 173, 176 (1977). 
Organized family planning programs have grown during a period of overall 
U.S. fertility decline. Most of the decline has been attributable to a reduc­
tion in unwanted and mistimed births, due to more consistent use of con­
traceptives, greater use of the more effective contraceptive methods, and 
improved efficacy in their use. 
Cutright & Jaffe, Family Planning Program Effects on the Fertility' of Low-Income 
U.S. Women, 8 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 101 (1976). 
63. Statistics show that the greatest decline of unwanted pregnancies was 
among the disadvantaged minorities and low income groups served by family plan­
ning programs. Cutright & Jaffe, supra note 62, at 101. 
"Typically, the clients of such programs are poor .... It is unlikely that all or 
even most of these clinic clients could go to private physicians or effectively use 
nonmedical contraceptives in the absence of organized family resources." Okada & 
Gillespie, supra note 62, at 176. 
Out of an estimated 2.2 million never-married 15- to 19-year-olds in need of 
family planning services, only about 200,000 higher income teenagers were esti­
mated to be using private physicians to obtain the needed care, while some 2 million 
would be in need of organized family planning programs. Morris, Estimating the 
Need for Family Planning Services Among Unwed Teenagers, FAM. PLAN. PERSPEC­
TIVES 91, 96 (1974). 
"While the proportion [of sexually active teenagers] obtaining contraceptive care 
from private physicians may have increased during this period, (post 1969) the most 
dynamic aspects of the situation have clearly been the increasing number of legal 
abortions and the rapid growth of adolescent utilization of clinic based contraceptive 
services." Jaffee & Dryfoos, supra note 26, at 172. 
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million, clinic patients had low or marginal incomes in 1976.64 The 
special value of these programs to minors is apparent from the in­
crease in the use of these programs by teenagers. 65 The extent to 
which the benefits of publicly sponsored family planning programs 
are conferred on indigent minors will depend on the degree to 
which unrestricted access to contraceptive services is protected by 
courts and legislatures. 
The following sections will examine the present strength of the 
minor's constitutional right to contraceptives and the competing 
constitutional right of parents to control the upbringing of their 
children. An analysis of these rights will demonstrate how the con­
stitutional right of minors to obtairi contraceptives can be promoted 
without unduly infringing on parental rights. 
IV. THE MINOR'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 

TO OBTAIN CONTRACEPTIVES 

The constitutional protection granted minors for access to con­
traceptives springs from the right of privacy. This right, first articu­
lated half a century ago in Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. 
United States, 66 has undergone a slow but constant expansion over 
the years. 67 This right of privacy seeks to protect individuals from 
unreasonable state interference with their personal activities. Its 
origin lies in the penumbras of the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and 
fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. 68 The protection, 
64. Torres, supra note 61, at 84. The need for contraceptives is further dem­
onstrated by the general trend of sharply increasing illegitimacy among the poor. In 
1977, the New York City Department of Health reported that between 1956 and 1976 
the rate of illegitimacy rose 1.7% among whites, 11.2% among Puerto Ricans, and an 
alarming 24% among non-whites. 1979 RP'rR. H.L.B. V-A-3 (Legal-Medical Studies, 
Inc.). 
65. Teenagers comprised some 40% of the new clientele of family planning 
programs in 1975 and accounted for 28% of all patients served in 1976. Torres, supra 
note 61, at 85. Of these new patients, 213 had used no previous methods of birth 
control or less effective methods. Id. at 85. 
66. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis characterized 
privacy as "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men." ld. at 478. 
67. See Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). But see 
Doe v. Commonwealth, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), in which the Court affirmed the deci­
sion of the Virginia court of appeals upholding the constitutionality of a Virginia 
sodomy statute by determining that it did not violate the homosexual's right to pri­
vacy. 
68. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
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under a privacy theory of individual decisions involving procrea­
tion, emerged in Griswold v. Connecticut. 69 There, the Court held 
that the right to obtain contraceptives is included in the fundamen­
tal right of marital privacy. The Court reasoned that the marital 
relationship should be protected because it lies "within the zone of 
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guaran-. 
tees."70 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,71 the Court extended the right to 
obtain contraceptives to single persons as well as married persons. 
The Eisenstadt Court determined that if the privacy right is to 
have significance it must mean "the right of the individual, married 
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether 
to bear or beget a child."72 Later, in Roe v. Wade,73 the Court 
ruled that the woman's right to obtain an abortion is protected by 
the right to privacy, and established gUidelines granting women the 
right to an abortion within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. 74 
The Court found that during this period a woman's fundamental 
right to privacy insulated her decision to terminate her pregnancy 
from state interference. 
These decisions establish that the constitutional right to pri­
vacy encompasses access to both contraceptives and abortion. They 
do not, however, clearly define the class of persons protected by 
this constitutional right. Although these decisions explicitly recog­
nize that adults should receive full constitutional protection, the 
Court has indicated subsequently that minors, thought of as lacking 
the necessary maturity to exercise these rights wisely, are not neces­
sarily entitled to the same protection. 75 The Court is still defining 
the extent of a minor's privacy rights to obtain contraceptives and 
abortions and determining whether restrictions on these rights, in 
the form of parental involvement, are constitutionally permissible. 
69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court invalidated a statute prohibiting the use of 
contraceptives. 
70. Id. at 485. 
71. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court struck down a Massachusetts statute on 
equal protection grounds, claiming that single as well as married persons must have 
the same right of privacy. 
72. Id. at 453. 
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
74. Id. at 163. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), which struck down 
statutory provisions conditioning the right to obtain an abortion in contravention of 
the guidelines established in Roe. 
75. See Carey v. Population Servs. Infl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 
428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
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The Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of parental 
consent provisions in the abortion context when it decided Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth. 76 There, the Court invalidated a statute 
which granted parents veto power over their daughter's decision to 
obtain an abortion. 77 The Court determined that the privacy right 
of the competent minor must take precedence over the state's in­
terest in safeguarding both parental authority and the family unit. 78 
It indicated, however, that the child's privacy right, unlike that of 
adults, was not fundamental in nature. Therefore, the consent pro­
visions did not have to pass a compelling state interest test to be 
held constitutional. 79 Instead, the Court determined that the state 
has broad authority to regulate the activities of children and 
employed the less stringent significant state interest test. 80 Even 
employing this lesser standard, the Court found that the state in­
terest in safeguarding the family unit and preserving parental au­
thority was not significant enough to justify infringing on the child's 
right of privacy. Nevertheless, the use of this test by the Court 
implied that the minor's right to privacy could be restricted by 
provisions which grant parents less than absolute veto power. 
After Danforth, the Court in Bellotti v. Baird,81 determined 
that parental notification82 requirements might be imposed on the 
minor's right to obtain an abortion. The Bellotti Court considered a 
Massachusetts statute which provided that parental consent was 
necessary before a minor could obtain an abortion, or, if consent 
was refused by the parents, authorization could be given by the 
order of a superior court judge for good cause shown. 83 The Su­
preme Court refused to invalidate this statute despite the apparent 
76. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
77. "[T]he state does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party 
an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his 
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy." Id. at 74. 
78. ld. at 75. 
79. The Court did, however, recognize that minors are protected by the Con­
stitution. 428 U.S. at 74. But see State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 
(1975). 
SO. ld. at 75. 
81. 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
82. The use of any provisions which make parental involvement mandatory 
would still intolerably impair the rights of minors where such restrictions are suffi­
cient to deter minors from seeking contraceptive services. See note 3 supra. See also 
Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. at 79-81; Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 793 n.ll (5th 
Cir. 1975); Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975); 6 FAM. PLAN. Popu­
LATION REp. 69, 75 (Oct. 1977). 
83. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1979). 
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limitations that it imposed on the minor's right to obtain an abor­
tion. Indicating that it might uphold the constitutionality of the 
statute provided that it did not ~'impose undue burdens on a minor 
capable of giving an informed consent,"84 the Court remanded the 
case for a determination of the legislative intent and the actual ex­
tent of the burdens placed on the pregnant minor.85 The district 
court subsequently determined that mandatory notification impermis- . 
sibly burdens the minor's constitutional right to privacy and invali­
dated the statute. 86 The United States Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari and once again will review the case.87 
The constitutionality of parental consent restrictions on a 
minor's right to obtain over-the-counter contraceptives was consi­
dered in Carey v. Population Services Internationa1. 88 Justice Bren­
nan, writing for a plurality of the Court, determined that any such 
restriction on the minor's right· to obtain non-prescription con­
traceptives unconstitutionally burdens the minor's privacy right. 89 
Applying the rationale of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, Justice 
Brennan reasoned, 
Since the State may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a 
blanket requirement of parental consent; on the choice of a mi­
nor to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket 
prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is a 
fortiori foreclosed. The State's interest in protection of the men­
tal and physical health of the pregnant minor, and in protection 
of potential life are clearly more implicated by the abortion deci­
sion than by the decision to use a nonhazardous contraceptive. 90 
This language suggests that a plurality of the Court considered the 
state's interest in regulating a minor's right to non-prescription con­
traceptives to be less than the interest in regulating abortion. De­
spite this distinction, the Carey Court used the same significant 
84. 428 U.S. at 147. 
85. Id. at 152. 
86. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass. 1978). 
87. Bellotti v. Baird, 47 U.S.L.W. 3292 (Oct. 31, 1978). The Supreme Court 
granted review to determine, among other things, if "MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 112, § 
12S, as inserted by St. 1974, ch. 706, § 1 and renumbered by St. 1977, ch. 397, 
violate[s] constitutional rights of minors ... under the Fourteenth Amendment by 
prohibiting physicians from performing abortions on minors without first obtaining 
parental consent or judicial authorization." Id. 
88. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Here, the Supreme Court invalidated a New York stat­
ute which prohibited the sale of contraceptives to persons under the age of 16. 
89. Id. at 691-96. 
90. Id. at 694 
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state interest test employed in Danforth to determine the uncon­
stitutionality of blanket parental consent requirements. As in the 
abortion decision, the Court stopped short of recognizing a minor's 
privacy right to access to contraceptives free of all parental in­
volvement. 
The failure to include prescription contraceptives within the 
plurality's rejection of blanket consent provisions limits the impact 
of the decision. 91 The Court thereby left open the question of 
whether minors possess a constitutional privacy right to obtain the 
most effective means of birth control. 92 In addition, the split 
among the justices as to the validity of restricting a minor's right to 
contraceptives considerably weakens the force of the Carey deci­
sion. Only three justices joined with Justice Brennan in his rejec­
tion of parental consent requirements. 93 None of the Justices indi­
cated that notification provisions are unconstitutional. 94 Rather, 
they explicitly recognized that some type of mandatory parental 
notice or consent provision, which would enable parents to be in­
91. Id. 
92. See note 14 supra, which indicates that medical contraceptives are much 
more effective in preventing pregnancy than non-medical contraceptives. In order to 
reach a meaningful evaluation of the potential danger of contraceptive use among 
teenagers, the alternative risk of uncontrolled fertility must be balanced against that 
danger. It has been determined that for women under 40, "all common methods of 
contraception, including the pill, encompass fewer risks than do pregnancy and 
childbirth." Health: The Family Planning Factor, POPULATION REP., Series J, No. 
14, at J-253, J-257 (1977). 
93. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun in 
the plurality opinion. 
94. Justices White, Stevens, and Powell concurred in the decision of the Court 
to strike down the New York statute preventing minors access to contraceptives, but 
did so for different reasons. Justice White agreed that the statute should be invali­
dated "primarily because the State has not demonstrated that the prohibition against 
the distribution of contraceptives to minors measurably contributes to the deterrent 
purposes which the State advances as justification for the restriction." Id. at 702. 
Justice Powell found the statute defective because it violated the rights of other 
groups; violating both the privacy rights of married females aged 14-16, and parents 
who may wish their children to have contraceptives. Id. at 707-08. Justice Stevens 
concurred in the result, but not in the use of the significant state interest standard. 
He did not believe that the holding of Planned Parenthood was dispositive as to this 
case, which involved contraception rather than abortion, because minors not yet preg­
nant have the choice of abstention. He considered the minor's right to contraception 
deserved of less than constitutional protection. Id. at 713. Stevens felt that the state 
does have a significant interest in discouraging sexual activity of minors under 16, 
but found that the statute in question did not reasonably further that purpose by 
providing an unwanted pregnancy as a punishment. "It is as though a State decided 
to dramatize its disapproval of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets." 
Id. at 715. 
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eluded in the decision-making process, is constitutionally compati­
ble with the minor's right to obtain contraceptives. 95 Therefore, it 
appears that a majority of the Supreme Court would uphold the 
validity of any restriction unless it "entirely frustrates or heavily 
burdens the excercise of constitutional rights in this area."96 Carey 
leaves the validity of parental notification and consent restrictions 
on a minor's right to prescription contraceptives subject to state 
and lower court interpretation. 
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to make the right of 
minors to obtain prescription contraceptives co-extensive with 
that of adults, the groundwork for establishing such a right has 
been recognized by the Court itself, lower courts, and commen­
tators. The recognition of minors' rights is a relatively recent de­
velopment in the law. 97 Rooted in notions of individual liberty, the 
growth of these rights has been encouraged by the civil rights 
movements of the sixties and seventies seeking to end discrimina­
98tion based on race and sex. Acknowledging the need to treat 
95. Justice White agreed with Justice Stevens who described "as 'frivilous' ap­
pellees' argument that a minor has the constitutional right to put contraceptives to 
their intended use, notwithstanding the combined objection of both parents and the 
State." Id. at 113. Justice Powell expressed his views clearly on the matter as he 
stated "that the State would further a constitutionally permissible end if it encour­
aged adolescents to seek the advice and guidance of their parents before deciding 
whether to engage in sexual intercourse." Id. at 709 (citing Planned Parenthood, 428 
U.S. at 91 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
Both Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented in toto. Justice Rehn­
quist pointed out that the New York legislature has the police power necessary to 
enact such legislation. ld. at 718. He indicated further that he would give support to 
parental consent provisions which sought to discourage the sexual activity of minors 
aged 14 through 16. Id. at 718-19. 
96. ld. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell suggested that this is the only 
time when a compelling state interest standard may be used. 
97. There are problems inherent in extending constitutional rights to minors. 
The difficulty lies with the fact that minors may have a limited mental capacity or 
maturity which could seriously hamper their ability to properly exercise an unre­
stricted right. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Res­
ervations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 76 B.Y.U.L. REv. 605, 611-13 
(1976). "Precisely because of their lack of capacity, minors should enjoy legally pro­
tected rights to special treatment (including some protection against their own im­
maturity) that will optimize their opportunities for the development of mature 
capabilities that are in their best interest." Id. at 650. Minimum age requirements 
have been established because of the recognition that "the development of the 
capacity for responsible choice selection is an educational process in which growth 
can be smothered and stunted if unlimited freedom and unlimited responsibility are 
thrust too soon upon the young." ld. 
98. "The liberation movements of the past hundred or more years have suc­
ceeded in establishing the principle, earlier proclaimed in our Declaration of Inde­
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minors as individuals has spawned the concept of children as "per­
sons"99 within the meaning of the Constitution and has established 
the basis for minor's rights. 
The Court's recognition of minor's rights emerged in In re 
Gault,100 where it determined that "neither the fourteenth amend­
ment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone. "101 This decision, 
however, went no further than to provide minors with certain pro­
cedural due process safeguards in juvenile court proceedings. 102 
The Court has also granted minors limited constitutional rights in 
the educational setting, holding that students have a first amend­
ment right to express their beliefs103 and procedural due process 
rights when faced with disciplinary action. 104 Although these deci­
sions afford minors constitutional rights equal to those of adults in 
only limited circumstances,105 they suggest that the constitutional 
rights of minors can be expanded into other areas where their in­
terests demand. 
Advocates of a minor's right to contraception stress the physical 
and emotional well-being of the child as a basis for such a right. lOS 
pendence, that there is a moral right to be regarded as a human being and not to be 
treated as a thing." Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 
( 1972). 
99. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); 
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see also 
Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
100. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). . 
101. Id. at 13. 
102. The Court has subsequently refused to extend these protections to include 
the right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. The Court determined that the estab­
lishment of such a right would impair the desired favorable treatment that a minor 
accused of criminal activity should receive. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 
(1971). 
103. In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court held 
that the first amendment rights of minors were violated when they were suspended 
from school for wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. The Court 
used sweeping language in support of the constitutional rights of minors stating that 
students "are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect," but 
limited its holding to the facts of the case. Id. at 511. 
104. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), proVides students with due process 
protections whenever they are confronted with disciplinary suspensions from schoo!. 
105. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
106. Commentators have called for the abolition of parental involvement re­
strictions when they interfere with the minor's right to contraception. "A single 
minor should have the legally protected right in every state to access to contracep­
tives without her parents' consent." A Minor's Right, supra note 4, at 270. It has 
further been suggested that the importance of the minor's right of access to con­
traceptives should prevent the state from reinforcing parental choices. "Therefore, 
requirements that minors obtain parental consent before obtaining contraceptives 
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Support for this right rests on the premise that "children are 
people; they are entitled to assert individual interests in their own 
right, to have a fair consideration given to their claims, and to have 
their best interests judged in terms of pragmatic consequences."107 
Lower courts have recognized the arguments of scholars ad­
vocating a highly protected constitutional right to contraception for 
minors. For example, the Utah district court in T __ H__ v. 
Jones108 determined that minors as well as adults have a fundamen­
tal right to contraceptives. 109 The court found that the minor's 
right to privacy was equal to that of adults when dealing with rights 
that affect the decision to bear children. In doing so the court 
struck down the mandatory parental consent provisions because 
there was no showing of a compelling state interest being served 
by consent requirements. The court indicated, however, that man­
datory parental notification might still be constitutionally compati­
ble with the minor's fundamental right to obtain contraceptives. 
Therefore, in order for minors to be granted unrestricted access to 
contraceptives, the social realities compelling such access must be 
emphasized to establish priority over the competing constitutional 
claims of parents. 
V. LIMITING PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT 
Parents have a long-standing right to control the rearing of 
their children. The common law has "long recognized parental 
rights as a key concept, not only for the specific purposes of do-
should be declared unconstitutional." Parental Consent Requirements, supra note 4, 
at 1001. See Zucherman, supra note 13; Comment, supra note 9; Note, Minor's Right 
to Abortion and Contraception: Prospects for Invalidating Less than Absolute Re­
strictions, 4 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 164 (1978). See generally Note, The Minor's 
Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 U. VA. L. REV. 305 
(1974), which called for the elimination of parental consent provisions in abortion 
statutes. 
107. Foster & Freed, supra note 98, at 346. This premise has led to the creation 
of a bill of rights for children which includes a provision calling for children to have 
a legal right "(t)o seek and obtain medical care...." Id. at 347. 
108. 425 F. Supp. 873 (1975). 
109. The district court held that minors have a fundamental right to contracep­
tives based on the constitutional right to privacy. The court found that "[t]he fi­
nancial, psychological and social problems arising from teenage pregnancy and 
motherhood argue for our recognition of the right of minors to privacy as being equal 
to that of adults." Id. at 881. The court also determined that the statute could be 
invalidated on equal protection grounds because it burdens only indigent minors in 
that there is no similar law prohibiting private physicians from prescribing con­
traceptives to their wealthier patients. Id. at 881-82. 
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mestic relations law, but as a fundamental cultural assumption 
about the family as a basic social, economical, and political unit. "110 
This recognition of the importance of parental rights suggests that 
parental power must prevail over the competing claims of outsid­
ers, and those of the children themselves absent compelling rea­
sons for limiting that power. 111 
Using early common law concepts of parental control, the Su­
preme Court has expanded the constitutional rights of parents to 
rear their children while, at the same time, placing constitutional 
limits on state interference in this area. 112 The Court first estab­
lished the strong policy for promoting parental rights in Meyer v. 
Nebraska.na In Meyer, the Court concluded that an individual's 
liberty interest under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment included the right to establish a home and bring up 
children.u4 Subsequently, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 115 the 
Supreme Court struck down an Oregon compulsory education stat­
ute which prevented children from attending private schools be­
cause it interfered with parents' right to direct the upbringing of 
their children. 116 In many decisions, using a similar approach, the 
Court has established a constitutional basis for the recognition of 
parental rights. 117 These decisions establish that parents have a 
constitutional right to privacy which gives them control over the 
rearing of their children. Moreover, due to the fundamental nature 
1l0. Hafen, supra note 97, at 615. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
lli. See Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (W.O. Mich. 1977); In re 
Guardianship of Faust, 239 Miss. 229, 305-07, 123 So. 2d 218, 220-21 (1960); 
Martarese v. Matarese, 47 R.l. 131, 132-33, 131 A. 198, 199 (1925); Hafen, supra note 
97, at 617. 
112. Hafen, supra note 97, at 619. 
113. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Court held that the right of parents to have their 
children taught a foreign l~nguage was sufficient to invalidate a state statute which 
probited such instruction. 
114. Id. at 399. 
115. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
116. Id. at 534-35. 
117. The Court has made it clear that there is a private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). This 
realm specifically includes the care, custody, management, and companionship of 
one's children. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). The Court has "recog­
nized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing 
of their children is basic in the structure of our society." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629, 639 (1968). See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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of this right, it can only be subject to state interference where a 
compelling state interest exists. 
The traditional protection afforded parental rights has provided 
parents with a strong argument against allowing state-funded family 
planning programs to distribute, without parental knowledge 6r 
consent, contraceptives to their children. The permissible extent 
of this parental involvement has been determined by lower courts 
without the benefit of strong Supreme Court guidance in this 
area. 1lS 
A recent Michigan federal district court case, Doe v. Irwin,119 
illustrates the type of decision that can arise when the Supreme 
Court fails to delineate the minor's right to contraceptives vis-a-vis 
the parents' right to rear their child. In this case, a group of par­
ents of minor, unemancipated children brought an action for decla­
ratory and injunctive relief against a state-funded family planning 
clinic which dispensed contraceptives to the minors without requir­
ing parental knowledge or consent. The parents alleged that the 
defendant clinic, operating under color of state law, was uncon­
sl:itutionally depriving them of their fundamental right to rear their 
c~ildren. The court agreed with the parent's contention finding 
118. Several jurisdictions have confronted the question of the validity of par­
ental consent provisions with varying responses. In 1973, a 16-year-old, unmarried 
girl bFOught a class action suit against Planned Parenthood to compel the availabil­
ity of contraceptives to minors without their parents' knowledge or consent. Doe v. 
Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah, 29 Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d 75, appeal dismissed 
for want of jurisdiction and cert. denied, 414 U.S. 805 (1973). The Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court's injunction claiming that granting minors access to 
contraceptives without requiring parental involvement deprives the parents of the 
right to rear their children. Id. at 358, 510 P.2d at 76. 
In Minnesota, the district court dismissed a suit brought against Planned Par­
enthood of Minnesota by parents who sought an injunction to prevent the dis­
tribution of contraceptives to minors without requiring parental consent. Maley v. 
Planned Parenthood, Minn. Dist. Ct., 3d Dist. No. 37769 (1975). The court also 
held, however, that those parents who specifically notified Planned Parenthood of 
Minnesota that they did not wish their children to receive such services were en­
titled to receive notice. Id. See also M.S. Wermers, 409 F. Supp. 312 (D.S.D. 
1976), vacated and remanded, 557 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1977). This decision held that a 
guardian must be appointed to protect the interests of a 15-year-old girl seeking con­
traceptives. The district court judge indicated that such a step was necessary to in­
sure that informed consent was established. 
These decisions indicate a general unwillingness of the courts to eliminate par­
ental involvement in the minors decision to use contraceptives. Where these deci­
sions impair family planning programs in their attempts to furnish contraceptives to 
minors, the rights of indigent minors are seriously infringed upon. See note 126-30 
supra and accompanying text. 
119. 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977). 
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that "even if there is a fundamental civil right among minors to 
obtain prescriptive contraceptives, that right need not exist to the 
total exclusion of the child's parents. "120 In holding that the family 
planning center could not distribute contraceptives without paren­
tal knowledge or consent, the court observed that the plurality of 
the Carey court required only that the significant state interest test 
be satisfied in order to justify restrictions on the privacy rights of 
minors.121 The court found that the potential harm to incompetent 
minors who are incapable of making decisions as to contraceptive 
use, the importance of preserving parental control over the rearing 
of their children, and the maintenance of family autonomy were 
sufficient state interests. 122 The Court in Irwin viewed parental 
rights as extremely important and suggested that where state­
sponsored family planning programs dispense contraceptives to mi­
nors, parental involvement is not only permitted under the consti­
tution but is compelled by it. 123 
120. Id. at 1254. 
121. Id. at 1258. For adults, a regulation burdening the right to bear or beget a 
child must be subject to the compelling state interest test, which requires narrowly 
drawn statutes with strong justifications. Id. 
122. The Court based its decision on three factors. 
First, the fact that parental privacy and religious beliefs are implicated. Sec­
ond, the decisions undertaken here by minors who may lack the capacity to 
make decisions in this area (and who have had only brief consultation with 
state officials) are within the sphere of decisions which parents are uniquely 
positioned to evaluate from the standpoint of the maturity and capacity of 
their offspring and to provide the necessary guidance. Finally, and most im­
portantly, these actions are carried out in an atmosphere of secrecy which 
fails to put parents on notice as to the state's actions relative to their chil­
dren and has the practical result of depriving parents of alternatives to coun­
teract such actions, if they· so desire. 
ld. at 1253. 
123. The court's rational in this case rests on assumptions of questionable valid­
ity. The court insisted that the actions of the state-funded clinic deprives parents of 
their right to rear their children because it forces them "to anticipate in advance the 
multitude of situations which may act upon their children and prepare them in ad­
vance to deal with any moral question that may arise in the cour~f that child's 
young life...." Id. at 1253. The court felt that this was especially true where the 
state-run clinic "facilitate{s) a situation inimical to the values the parents are at­
tempting to teach their children." Id. It is clear that !he court views the clinic's ac­
tions as directly undermining the rights of the parents. 
The validity of this view is in doubt because of the nature of the state action in­
volved here. By providing minors with contraceptives absent parental knowledge or 
consent, the court is merely facilitating a right of the child, in the interests of the 
child. As a practical matter, the action of the clinic is neutral with respect to the 
rights of the parents to rear their children. The clinic's policy does not prevent par­
ents from instilling their moral beliefs in their children. Once the minor decides to 
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The Irwin decision illustrates the problems generated by rec­
ognizing strong parental rights .. By emphasizing the importance of 
competing parental claims, the significance of the minor's right is 
proportionately reduced. If distributing contraceptives to minors 
by state-sponsored family planning programs unconstitutionally in­
fringes on parental rights, the source of contraceptives for all 
minors who depend on such programs will be jeopardized. In order 
to prevent a serious reduction in the number of minors who seek 
contraception and a' concomitant rise in the number of unwanted 
pregnancies, co uris must be willing to re-examine the priority they 
have accorded parental privacy rights. 
Parents' rights do not always merit priority over the rights of 
their children and may be limited in appropriate circumstances. 
Where parents are acting in their children's interests there is no 
reason for limiting their right to control the decisions of their chil­
dren. But, where the particular minor's interest is in conflict with 
parental rights, the state may intervene to protect the welfare of 
the minor child. 124 The Supreme Court has also recognized that 
parental rights can be limited in certain situations despite its grant­
ing parents fundamental rights to control many of the activities of 
their children. A basis for subordinating the rights of parents to 
those of their children, in the interests of promoting the latter's 
welfare, was suggested by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder. 125 The Yoder Court permitted the first amendment rights of 
parents to outweigh the competing interests of the state and, argu­
ably, that of their children to continue a compulsory education. 
The Court, however, also recognized that parental rights might be 
outweighed where there is a danger that an unrestricted exercise of 
engage in sexual activity contrary to the wishes of her parents, it is seriously doubted 
that they would prefer an unwanted pregnancy as a punishment for the minor's dif­
fering views. It is much more likely that they would prefer the alternative of contra­
ception. 
Providing minors with unrestricted access to contraceptives is not intended to be 
a means of promoting promiscuity among them. Further, this policy is not designed 
to make minors act contrary to the morals of their parents. Rather, the furnishing of 
contraceptives is an attempt to enable minors to deal with the realities of sexual 
activity when they are already contemplating or engaged in that activity. 
124. The state has assumed the prerogative, through its police power and par­
ens patriae power, to take custody of children from their parents when the child has 
been abused, abandoned, or neglected. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944); S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL (1971). The state may generally act to take 
the necessary steps to promote the best interests of the child. 
125. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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those rights "will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or 
have a potential for significant social burdens. "126 
The minor's need for unrestricted access to contraception satis­
fies both the conditions set forth in Yoder. As alluded to earlier, 
contraception is vital to the protection of the minor's health and 
welfare. 127 Additionally, when contraceptives are readily available, 
the number of unwanted children born to those least able to afford 
them decreases dramatically, relieving a major burden on strained 
social resources. 128 Under this analysis, the minor's right to con­
traception can be viewed as more important than parental rights. 
This view demands that the state be constitutionally permitted to 
provide contraceptive programs and services that enable minors to 
freely exercise their right to decide whether to bear children. 129 
From the parents' point of view, two basic arguments support 
mandatory parental involvement requirements and cut against the 
minor's unrestricted access to prescription contraceptions. First, 
parents may fear that their children will be exposed to the medical 
dangers inherent in the use of prescription contraceptives. In addi­
tion, they may be concerned with the moral implications involved 
in the unrestricted availability of contraceptives. 
Legal reform allowing minors access to prescription contracep­
tives should include protections to limit the medical risks involved. 
State and federally funded family planning programs should main­
tain minimum procedures which provide the minor client with a 
maximum of freedom of choice while safeguarding her health and 
126. Id. at 233-34; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 138, 166-67 (1944). This 
has also been reflected in state decisions. "[W]here a child's well-being is placed in 
issue, 'it is not the rights of parents that are chiefly to be considered. The first and 
paramount duty is to consult the welfare of the child.' " Custody of a Minor, 1978 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2002, 2025-26 (citing Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 199 (1907)). 
This case held that the courts do have the power to override the rights of parents to 
rear their children in ordering certain medical treatment which could possibly save 
the child's life. Although the minor's very existence is not necessarily threatened by 
the failure to provide contraceptives, the ramifications are potentially damaging to 
the minor's welfare. 
127. See notes 18-29 supra and accompanying text. 
128. See note 52 supra and accompanying text. 
129. In certain situations, mandatory parental involvement may only aggravate 
existing conflicts and, in the long run, contribute to the detriment of the minor. 
"Pregnancy [and] contraceptive information ... are among the sensitive problems 
where a rule requiring parental consent for treatment may be counter-productive." 
Foster & Freed, supra note 98, at 359. "[T]he welfare of minors and of the commu­
nity concur and take precedence over parental authority, for to hold otherwise is to 
vindicate an ineffectual power at the expense of a social reality." Id. at 360. See A 
Minor's Right, supra note 4; Parental Consent Requirements, supra note 4. 
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safety.130 For instance, procedures should be established by which 
program staff members can determine whether the minor has suffi­
cient capacity to understand the inherent risks and benefits of par­
ticular contraceptive devices. This will ensure that the minor is in 
fact giving an informed consent to contraceptive services. Family 
planning programs should also require that attending physicians ob­
tain and review the medical records of their minor client. In this 
way, sound recommendations can be made, increasing the chances 
that the minor will receive proper treatment and reducing the risks 
of serious physical harm. 13l Additionally, follow-up care for minor­
clients should be made mandatory for all family planning programs 
to help protect minors from unforeseen and harmful consequences 
resulting from the use of unfamiliar contraceptives. 132 These sug­
gested procedures, not meant to be all inclusive, represent a prac­
tical means for reducing the risks of furnishing minors prescription 
contraceptives. 
The contention, advanced by those who support parental in­
volvement, that state action in supplying contraceptives morally 
condones and encourages sexual activity among minors is un­
founded. In fact, reliable studies indicate that minors will continue 
to engage in sexual intercourse despite the unavailability of con­
traceptives. 133 It is unlikely that parents who understand the al­
ternatives would rather that their children experience unwanted 
pregnancies than obtain contraception without their knowledge or 
consent. 134 In any event, it is probably safe to conclude that the 
130. These procedures are based in part on suggestions made by the American 
Medical Association as set forth in A Minor's Right, supra note 4, at 290-91. 
131. See generally Kaufman, When Teen-agers Ask for the Pill, 2 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSPECTIVES 49 (1970). 
132. See 45 C.F.R. § 220.21 (1976), which provides that publicly funded family 
planning services include diagnosis, treatment, supplies (choice of method), and 
follow-up care. 
133. Pilpel & Wechsler, Birth Control, Teen-agers and the Law: A New Look, 
1971,3 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 37 (1971); A Minor's Right, supra note 3, at 273. 
"[I]t is clear that a substantial number of minors will engage in sexual activities 
despite bans on contraceptives." Parental Consent Requirements, supra note 4, at 
1010. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 792 (5th Cir. 1975). 
134. Such an attitude is implied from popular opinion. In a survey taken of four 
cities, 74-88% of the respondents agreed that sexually active teenagers should have 
access to contraceptives on request. Pomeroy & Landman, Public Opinion Trends: 
Elective Abortion and Birth Control Services to Teenagers, 4 FAM. PLAN. PERSPEC­
TIVES 44, 51 (1972). Another study, representing the views of middle class Ameri­
cans, revealed that an overwhelming majority believe that birth control services 
should be made available to unwed teenagers. Middle-Class Americans Frown on 
738 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vo\. 1:711 
Supreme Court would not support statutes, decisions, or regu­
lations which prescribe an unwanted pregnancy as "punishment" 
for sexual activity thought by parents to be immoral. 135 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The minor's right to obtain prescription contraception remains 
subject to constitutionally permissible parental involvement re­
quirements. Although some jurisdictions limit the extent of these re­
strictions, a real danger exists that such requirements, perpetu­
ated by successful constitutional challenges to the actions of state­
sponsored programs, will continue to discourage minors from seek­
ing prescription contraceptives. 
To insure that family planning programs continue to provide 
needed services to sexually active indigent minors, the courts and 
legislatures must recognize the extreme importance of access to 
contraceptives. Therefore, the minor's constitutional right to obtain 
contraception, recognized in Carey, must be expanded to include 
the right to obtain prescription contraceptives unrestricted by pa­
rental involvement. To accomplish this objective it may be neces­
sary to treat this right as fundamentaJ.136 Alternatively, mandatory 
parental involvement may be eliminated without the courts express­
ing the minor's right to obtain contraceptives in fundamental 
terms. For instance, when faced with statutory provisions requiring 
parental involvement, the courts should adopt a Danforth type 
analysis and determine that the state's interest in safeguarding the 
family unit and preserving parental authority are not "significant" 
enough to justify infringing on the child's right to privacy. Simi­
larly, when faced with direct challenges to the practice of publicly 
funded clinics in dispensing prescription contraceptives without pa­
rental involvement, as in Irwin, courts should consider the excep-
Premarital Sex But Think Teens Should Be Offered Contraception, 10 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSPECTIVES 301 (1978). 
135. The Carey Court, in reaching its holding, dispelled the argument that the 
availability of contraceptives necessarily promotes premarital sexual activity among 
minors. Using .language from Eisenstadt, the Court reasoned that "[ilt would be 
plainly unreasonable to assume that (the state) has prescribed pregnancy and the 
birth of an unwanted child (or the physical and psychological dangers of abortion) as 
punishment for fornication." 431 U.S. at 695 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448). 
136. The minor's right to contraception, as a fundamental right, should demand 
that the compelling state interest test be used rather than the less stringent signifi­
cant state interest test. Balanced against the parents fundamental right to rear their 
children, the minor's right to contraceptives could prevail against inhibitory restric­
tions. 
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tions to parental authority recognized in Yoder to embrace unre­
stricted access to contraceptives for minors. 
Both the courts and legislatures should recognize that granting 
minors unrestricted access to contraceptives is not an endorsement 
or sanctioning of teenage sexual activity. It is, rather, a necessary 
step of dealing with a serious social problem. The purpose is to 
provide sexually active teenagers with a meaningful choice of 
whether or not to bear children. In order to make this choice, low 
income minors need the aid of family planning programs which 
alone can provide them with free or inexpensive contraceptive 
services. Without responsive family planning programs, this seg-: 
ment of the population is left with the alternatives of abstention 
from sex, illegal abortion, or an unintended family. With such pro­
grams, free from the requirements of parental involvement there is 
hope that the incidence of untimely and unwanted pregnancies can 
be significantly reduced. 
David Ian Schoen 
